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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SALT LAKE PIANO COMPANY, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
RICHARD F. WILLIAMS 
SANDRA G. WILLIAMS, 
Husband and Wife, 
Defendants 
and Appellant, ) 
and ) 
formerly ) 
> and Respondent. ) 
ANSWER TO PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
Circuit Court 
No. 81 CVMU 4817 
Utah Court of Appeals 
No. 890199-CA 
Category 14b 
COMES NOW the defendant and respondent Sandra G. Williams 
(defendant), by and through her attorney, Lynn P. Heward, and 
submits this Answer to Petition for Rehearing pursuant to the 
request of the Court and in accordance with Rule 35 of the Rules 
of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROVIDED SUFFICIENT EXPLANATION OF ITS RULING 
In its "Supplemental Motion to Reconsider," plaintiff 
contends that Rule 4Kb) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
mandates Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law when there is an 
involuntary dismissal. A careful reading of this rule reveals 
that such is not the case. 
Rule 4Kb) reads as follows: 
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute 
or to comply with these rules or any order of 
court, a defendant may move for dismissal of 
an action or of any claim against him. After 
the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court 
without a jury, has completed the presentation 
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of his evidence the defendant, without waiving 
his right to offer evidence in the event the 
motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal 
on the ground that upon the facts and the law 
the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. 
The court as trier of the facts may then 
determine them and render judgment against the 
plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment 
until the close of all the evidence. If the 
court renders judgment on the merits against 
the plaintiff, the court shall make findings 
as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the court 
in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, 
a dismissal under this subdivision and any 
dismissal not provided for in this rule, 
other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction 
or for improper venue or for lack of an indis-
pensable party, operates as an adjudication 
upon the merits. [Emphasis added.] 
It is clear from the context of this rule that the Court 
need only make findings when it grants defendant's motion to 
dismiss at trial upon the close of plaintiff's case in chief. In 
the instant matter, the case never went to trial; there was no 
evidentiary hearing. 
An example of a case where the Rule 4Kb) mandate for 
findings applied was Davis v. Payne and Day, Inc., 10 Utah 2d 53, 
348 P.2d 337 (1960). There the trial court, sitting without a 
jury, failed to make "findings of fact as authorized by Rule 
4Kb) U.R.C.P." upon granting defendant's motion to dismiss after 
hearing plaintiff's evidence. 
In that case, the Supreme Court did not automatically 
reverse, but rather considered the evidence in the light most 
favorable to him. Here, plaintiff argues, and rightfully so, that 
in any event this Court must have the evidence considered in the 
light most favorable to it anyway insofar as the review of this 
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matter is considered analogous to a review of the granting of 
Summary Judgment. 
A case where the Appellate Court was recently reviewing 
a Summary Judgment is quite helpful in this regard. In Taylor 
v. Estate of Grant Taylor, 102 U.A.R. 36 (Utah App. 1989) the 
trial court ruled that a document was invalid and assessed attorney's 
fees against the plaintiff. The trial court's order did not specify 
the legal basis for the award nor how the court arrived at the 
amount assessed. 
The Taylor court stated on pages 38 to 39: 
At the outset, we note that findings of fact 
are unnecessary in connection with summary 
judgment decisions. 
... 
[T]he material facts aref by definition, 
undisputed and there are no facts which the 
court has to find. 
The decision went on to show that there were no disputes 
with respect to the material facts. It then addressed on page 39 
the problem created by an absence in the record of the trial 
judge's legal basis for awarding attorney's fees: 
However, to affirm this award we must also 
conclude, in light of the undisputed facts, 
that a legal basis exists for the award. Our 
task is complicated somewhat by the fact that 
the exact legal basis the court had in mind in 
awarding fees does not appear in the court's 
judgment. No transcript was made of the 
hearing during which the issue of fees was 
argued, nor is there a written memorandum 
informing this court and the parties of the 
trial court's legal view of the matter. 
However, it is appropriate that we affirm if 
the trial court's decision can be sustained on 
any proper legal basis. 
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The Court went on to determine that the undisputed facts 
legally supported the ruling on the validity of the document and 
formed a sufficient basis for the trial court's discretion to 
grant attorney's fees. However, only Rule 11 seemed to support 
the award for attorney's fees, and no fact in the record justified 
applying that Rule to the plaintiff and not to his attorney, so a 
remand on that issue was necessary. 
In the instant matter, even though "it is appropriate 
[to] affirm if the trial court's decision can be sustained on any 
proper legal basis," the task is simpler by reason of the language 
of the Order of Dismissal specifying certain bases which the trial 
court had in mind in granting the dismissal with prejudice. 
As indicated in that Order, the dismissal was grounded 
in Rules 4 and 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and in addition, 
upon the equitable principle of laches. 
This specification by the trial court of its grounds 
would appear to qualify as "a brief written statement of the 
ground for its decision." However, plaintiff has argued that 
this written statement contained in the Order is less than what is 
required by Rule 52. Even if plaintiff were correct in its view 
that the statement of grounds is more cryptic than envisioned by 
the drafters of Rule 52, that rule only requires such a statement 
on motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59. 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was not necessarily granted under 
one of those enumerated rules. In fact, this list omits the two 
rules specified by the trial court. 
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THERE ARE NO MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT 
Plaintiff has claimed that numerous "facts" have been 
overlooked or misapprehended by this Court in upholding the ruling 
of the trial court. As these are examined, it can be seen that 
each claimed fact is irrelevant to the Court's decision and/or has 
no evidence to support it. 
It is logical to assume that the trial court used as the 
factual basis for its decision the verified Statement of Facts 
contained in the defendant's Statement of Points and Authorities 
in Support of Motion to Dismiss dated February 1, 1989, which 
document was attached to the Motion for Summary Affirmance dated 
April 20, 1989 and filed herein. 
A review of that Statement of Facts shows that they are 
uncontroverted. The closest that defendant comes to a dispute of 
these facts is contained in the last two lines of page 7 of its 
Statement of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Motion to 
Dismiss dated February 16, 1989, which document was attached to 
the Response to Motion for Summary Affirmance dated April 24, 
1989: "She claims that she was unaware that she owed plaintiff 
any money. Horsefeathers." 
The Supreme Court in Massey v. Utah Power & Light, 609 
P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1980) stated that "bare contentions, unsupported 
by any specification of facts in support thereof, raise no material 
questions of fact as will preclude the entry of summary judgment." 
In Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636 
(Utah App. 1988), cited by plaintiff, this Court stated that it 
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takes a "sworn statement to dispute the averments on the other 
side of the controversy and create such an issue [a genuine issue 
of material fact]." Ld. at 640. The Court noted that the appellant 
had "not pointed to any sworn evidentiary material in the record" 
(Id. at 642) creating a dispute regarding essential elements of 
appellant's seventh cause of action. Therefore, the summary 
judgment against appellant on that cause was upheld. 
Plaintiff has expressed concern over omission by the 
Court's Memorandum Decision of the following facts: 
1. Plaintiff filed an action in 1978 which was deemed 
dismissed under Rule 4(b) when no defendant was served within one 
year. 
2. Details of other efforts of plaintiff. 
3. Specification that the divorce of the defendants occurred 
after their move from Utah. 
4. Specification that service of summons on defendant 
was by means of acceptance of service by counsel. 
5. Defendant moved for summary disposition on appeal. 
6. Plaintiff followed the procedure required by Rule 71B. 
7. Plaintiff claimed before the trial court that Rule 
71B applied. 
Even assuming that these numbered facts are accurate and 
supported by the record, which some are and all may be, in the 
case of each such numbered fact (a) its omission does not show 
its misapprehension by the Court, (b) it is irrelevant to the 
reasoning of the decision, and/or (c) alternative grounds contained 
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in the decision still justify exactly the same result. 
The only facts which might possibly reach the level 
of causing an altering of the reasoning of the Memorandum Decision 
would be numbers 6 and 7 regarding Rule 71B. 
In its Statement of Points and Authorities in Opposition 
to Motion to Dismiss dated February 16, 1989, plaintiff argued 
that Rule 71B applied. 
Defendant's counsel received a letter dated May 23, 
1988, from plaintiff's counsel: 
Enclosed is a Rule 71B affidavit to be 
filed in the above entitled matter. As you 
will recall, we discussed the methodology of 
fully complying with the provisions of Rule 
71B, and we agreed that if I would prepare and 
file an affidavit we would consider Rule 71B 
to have been fully complied with. Your agreement 
does not prejudice your right to challenge the 
applicability of the Rule, but simply agrees 
that we need not start over, and that you will 
not challenge the Rule for technical reasons. 
Such an affidavit may have been executed and filed. As 
can be seen, defendant's counsel attempted to assist plaintiff 
in matters such as the service of process in order to save the 
parties additional expense and delay which seemed to serve no 
useful purpose. The defendant desired an expeditious final and 
complete resolution of this action. 
RULE 71B DOES NOT JUSTIFY REVERSAL 
Rule 4(b) states that summons must be served within one 
year from the date the complaint is filed. It states that when 
there are more than one defendant, once one defendant has been 
served any others may be served at any time before trial. 
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Rule 4(b) does not clarify the procedure where one defendant 
has been served and trial held and another defendant may be served 
before the expiration of one year. That situation is covered by 
Rule 71B. 
Plaintiff has argued that even though the one year 
expired long ago, Rule 71B nevertheless applies. It argues that 
even though Rule 4(b) provides for only one exception to the deemed 
dismissal for failure to serve a defendant within one year, and 
even though Rule 71B does not even refer to the Rule 4(b) dismissal, 
that Rule 71B should be construed to provide another exception. 
There is no reason for Rule 71B to be construed to contradict the 
plain language of Rule 4(b). 
If Rule 71B were to have any effect more than one year 
after the filing of the Complaint, it would seem to be only as an 
alternative to filing a new action after a dismissal under Rule 
4(b), assuming that the said deemed dismissal were construed to be 
without prejudice. Hence it would be subject to the same defenses 
as a new action against the remaining defendant or defendants. 
These defenses would include those specified by the trial court as 
reasons for dismissal with prejudice, namely, the bar resulting 
from two prior dismissals in light of Rules 4 and 41, and the 
equitable principle of laches. 
Thus even if Rule 71B might allow service after one year, 
this Court's Memorandum Decision is still certainly accurate in 
stating that Rule 71B cannot justify a failure to serve this defendant 
for almost seven years, particularly when she had no knowledge of 
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any claim or action filed against her. 
RULE 41 MANDATES DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE 
Plaintiff argues that since the dismissals referred to 
above were not technically voluntarily obtained in accordance with 
the procedures in Rule 41(a), they do not suffice to bar a subsequent 
filing. Rule 41(a) should not be read so narrowly. 
There was no action on the part of the defendant, such 
as a motion to quash, in the case of either dismissal. In each 
case, plaintiff filed the action and then did not serve the defendant 
within one year nor before trial. It would be incongrous to 
allow the unilateral actions of a plaintiff to result in two 
dismissals, both without prejudice, despite the rule that the 
second voluntary dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits. 
Rule 41 also encompasses, in subdivision (b), dismissal 
for failure to prosecute. As indicated in plaintiff's Motion to 
Reconsider; Petition for Rehearing, dated June 14, 1989, dismissal 
for failure to prosecute is a variation of the doctrine of laches, 
and therefore most of the applicable principles will be discussed 
below under Laches. 
One argument brought up by plaintiff that apparently 
only applies to its failure to prosecute is the argument that 
plaintiff's motion to dismiss on that basis came too late. 
Plaintiff cannot claim prejudice by any delay or implied 
waiver of this basis. The very first document filed by defendant 
in response to the first documents served on her was her Answer 
dated February 19, 1988. The Fourth Defense in that Answer was 
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"This action should be dismissed with prejudice for failure to 
prosecute." 
Defendant's delay in bringing a Motion to Dismiss on 
this basis was only to allow time for discovery to produce the 
facts appropriate for the trial court's consideration in ruling on 
such a motion. 
In the case of Wilson v. Lambert, 613 P.2d 7(55 (Utah 
1980), the same issue was raised. The action was filed in 1968. 
In January of 1978, the trial court sua sponte considered the 
question of dismissal for failure to prosecute, but decided to set 
the matter for trial. Nine months later, the defendant in that 
case filed a motion to dismiss for failure to diligently prosecute, 
which was granted. 
In upholding the dismissal, the Supreme Court stated: 
Plaintiffs argue ... that defendant waived 
the right to move for dismissal on the stated 
grounds by not doing so at an earlier date. 
Rule 4Kb) sets no deadline for the moving 
party to act; indeed, the court retains inherent 
power to dismiss an action for failure to 
prosecute pursuant to its own motion. It can 
hardly be asserted that a defendant must, on 
pain of implied waiver, move within a certain 
time limit, when the court may issue a dismissal 
order without any action whatsoever on the 
part of the parties. Ld. at 768. 
LACHES FULLY JUSTIFIES THE COURT'S EXERCISE OF DISCRETION 
It would seem that the factors to be considered in 
applying the principle of laches are the actions of each party 
with respect to moving the case forward and the length of time 
involved. 
Plaintiff complains at what it views as short shrift 
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given its list of actions taken to serve the defendant with summons. 
It is true that the circumstances of each case and the actions of 
each party should be examined, but that does not mean that the 
"due diligence" of the plaintiff must only be evaluated by a 
subjective standard. 
Looking at the delay objectively, absolutely nothing 
took place in the case as to this defendant from the time it was 
filed in 1981 until she was served in 1988. 
As it states in 24 AmJur 2d Dismissal Sect. 50 at 42, 
"plaintiff's obligation is satisfied by a showing of progress" 
[emphasis added]. There is no showing of progress with respect to 
any defendant after 1981 until the 1988 acceptance of service. 
Another way of measuring the efforts objectively is to 
compare their results to the results obtained for a $25 initial 
investment in November of 1987, several months after plaintiff had 
abandoned its efforts to locate the defendant. That expenditure 
resulted in someone new examining the facts and locating the 
defendant by the following month. 
Even if that is not a fair comparison due to better 
technology becoming available, a case should not be able to be 
resurrected indefinitely as new technology is developed. The 
basis for statutes of limitation and laches is that after a certain 
stated or equitable period of time a person should be free from 
having to defend against a stale claim. 
Perhaps the years of delay and the absence of successful 
action by the plaintiff might be mitigated somewhat if defendant had 
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unclean hands or tried to impede or thwart plaintiff's efforts to 
move this case forward, but such was not the case. 
Plaintiff tries to use innuendo and accusations and 
criticism to paint the defendant as a person who knew she owed the 
plaintiff money and purposefully violated her contract and tried 
to hide and evade. But the facts and reason show just the opposite. 
The verified facts are that the defendant moved from 
this state in 1977 under the impression that the debts owed, 
including the debt to plaintiff, were paid. They had sold their 
home in Utah for a good profit, and she assumed her husband, who 
handled the finances, had paid their debts. She and her husband 
separated in about 1980 and within a few months they were divorced. 
He has not paid any support for their child since then. Defendant 
has of course had to personally handle the family finances since 
then and has openly sought and obtained credit in her married name 
for consumer items. She was unaware until 1987 that plaintiff 
claimed a balance was still owing. 
In contrast to these plain, simple, understandable, and 
reasonable facts sworn to on the record, plaintiff condemns the 
defendant for (a) moving from the state of Utah without notice to 
plaintiff, (b) taking the piano from the state in violation of the 
agreement, (c) never contacting the plaintiff to see what if any 
amount was owed, (d) moving without leaving precise forwarding 
addresses, (e) not informing plaintiff of the divorce decree 
provisions, (f) residing outside the state of Utah without trying 
to contact or pay plaintiff what she knew to have been owing at 
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one time, (g) demonstrating no hardship by reason of the delay 
(other than a ten-fold increase in the amount claimed that anyone 
would have to defend). 
Even if defendant had known that any debt to plaintiff 
was still unpaid/ these actions would certainly not rise to the 
level of unclean hands or otherwise prevent the court from doing 
equity. For example, it would seem unlikely that a wife who 
relied on her husband in financial matters and signed with him on 
a purchase agreement would read or remember the provision in small 
print requiring her to get permission before moving their piano to 
a new address. And if she did remember, it would be unlikely for 
her to really believe she had to personally take care of that 
before they could move. 
Once such facts and arguments were presented, the trial 
court employed its discretion in dismissing on the basis of laches. 
No exact rule can be laid down as to when a 
court is justified in dismissing a case for 
the plaintiff's failure to prosecute or for 
delay in prosecuting his action; each case 
must be looked at with regard to its own 
peculiar procedural history and the situation 
at the time of dismissal. The question of 
laches ordinarily depends on whether, under 
the facts and circumstances of the particular 
case, the plaintiff is chargeable with want of 
due diligence in failing to proceed with 
reasonable promptness. The question is addressed 
to the sound judicial discretion of the trial 
court, whose ruling will not be disturbed on 
review in the absence of anything to indicate 
abuse of discretion in this respect. 24 AmJur 
Dismissal Sect. 50 at 40-41. 
[T]he trial court may dismiss an action where 
there has been a failure, for an unreasonable 
period of time after the filing of the complaint, 
to have the summons issued .... 
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Dismissal or discontinuance of an action 
for delay in the issuance or service of summons 
[not based on statute or rules of court] is a 
matter committed to the trial courtfs discretion. 
24 AmJur Dismissal Sect. 51 at 42-43. 
This general rule has been specifically endorsed and 
applied in Utah: 
Pursuant to this rule [41(b)], it is held, in 
both state and federal practice, that the 
disposition of a motion to dismiss for failure 
to prosecute rests with the sound discretion 
of the trial court, and that a ruling will not 
be upset absent a showing of abuse of that 
discretion. Wilson v. Lambert, 613 P.2d 765, 
767 (Utah 1980). 
As to the standard for determining an abuse of discretion, 
the general rule is that the appellate Court presumes that the 
discretion was properly exercised unless the record clearly shows 
the contrary. Donohue v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 748 
P.2d 1067 (1987). 
When plaintiff's counsel indicated the possibility of 
appealing this matter, it was brought to his attention that a 
basis for the ruling was laches, and an abuse of discretion would 
have to be shown. Nevertheless this costly appeal was instituted. 
This Court was absolutely correct in ruling that the 
issue herein is straightforward; the appeal is wholly without 
merit, if not frivolous; the trial court's exercise of its discretion 
was clearly not abusive; summary affirmance is entirely justified; 
and double costs are appropriately assessed against the plaintiff 
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and appellant. 
DATED this 3 0" day of ^TZw-^ , 1989. 
_y^^x^-f\—Hi 
LYNN P. HEWARD 
Attorney for Defendant and Respondent 
Sandra G. Williams 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four true and exact copies of 
the foregoing Answer to Petition for Rehearing were mailed or 
delivered to Robert L. Lord, 320 South 300 East, #4A, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111, on this 31? ~~ day of J^w-^_ , 1989. 
